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Abstract
The transition from socialism to capitalism has spawned a large literature on
comparative policy reforms. While many sociologists using qualitative data have
concluded that neo-liberal reforms led to negative outcomes, a large body of crossnational literature, mostly from economics and political science, claims that more
neo-liberal reforms produced better economic and political outcomes. These latter
studies almost all use measures of policy reform constructed by economists at the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We show, using the
EBRD’s own data, that their indices of progress in market reforms are biased in the
direction of positive growth. That is, the EBRD’s bureaucracy over-codes the more
successful countries. When one accounts for this bias, the relationship between the
EBRD’s transition indicators and growth significantly weakens or disappears. These
findings have implications for social scientific research using statistics constructed by
international organizations, like the World Bank and the IMF.
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Introduction
Cross-national analysis relying on policy indices created by international
policy institutions, such as the World Bank, Heritage Foundation and Freedom House,
have become mainstream in macro-analysis in sociology, political science and
economics. These statistics crucially inform debates about the appropriate policies for
promoting economic and political development, including those on property rights
(Acemoglu et al 2001; Levine 2005), corruption (Mauro 1995; Mo 2001; Barro 1991),
governance (Kaufmann et al 2003) and democracy (Lee 2005; Paxton 2002; Wejnert
2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2004; Ross 2006). Yet, as sociologists, we recognize the
intimate relation between power and knowledge (Foucault 1980) and the universal,
but hidden, possibility that those who construct these statistics could introduce bias in
the direction of power, which could greatly affect the outcomes being studied.
Although previous work has questioned the validity of some policy indices as
analytical constructs (Kurtz and Schrank 2007) and their potential for measuring
underlying government choices rather than just the actual policy (Rodrik 2005), to our
knowledge no study has successfully tested for bias per se in their construction (i.e.,
in the statistic-generating process). What has restricted previous efforts has been the
lack of ‘gold-standard’, or actual data on policy implementation for comparison with
the codings by the policy institutions. Usually, because these institutions have the
advantage of greater access to the data, and in many cases a complete monopoly on
the resources for research, any policy data underlying the statistics are often not easily
reproducible or kept secret (e.g., World Bank Governance Indicators or IMF Index of
Conditionality Implementation).
Both methodologically and substantively, we plan to assess this potential for
bias in the statistics produced by international financial institutions (IFIs) on one of
the most profound economic experiments of our time: the transitions from statesocialism to capitalism in eastern Europe during the 1990’s. At no other period in
modern history have so many radical and widely contested economic reforms been
imposed so quickly on societies. From the outset of transition, intellectuals agreed
upon the need for reform but disputed the appropriate pace and scale of liberalization
(the “Shock Therapy versus Gradualism” debate) (Sachs 1990; Stiglitz 1999). IFIs,
particularly the World Bank and IMF, played crucial roles in both legitimating and
evaluating the neo-liberal ‘Shock Therapy’ platform (Wedel 2001; Gowan 1999). As
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the principal monitors and evaluators of transition policies, these institutions could be
considered “global knowledge agencies”, to emphasize their roles in producing
knowledge for policymakers and academics (Toye and Toye 2005).
One of the most important knowledge agencies during transition was the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), a bank established to
support ex-communist countries administratively and financially during transition.
Since 1994, the EBRD has constructed an annual Transition Indicator database to
“provide an understanding of how, why and by what means transition policies have
related to economic growth and social development” (EBRD 1994: 9). These statistics
– the ‘ultimate’ documents for studying transition (Dejak 2005: 49) – have been used
by many prominent social scientists, including Åslund (2007), Fischer (2000), Lane
(2006), Sachs (1996), and Stiglitz (2006).
Most quantitative analysis, drawing heavily upon the EBRD’s Transition
Indicator statistics 1 , has identified positive effects of the rapid approach (e.g., Sachs
1996; Fischer and Sahay 2000; de Melo et al 1996). Yet, a large body of work by
global ethnographers and qualitative researchers has consistently found negative
outcomes in connection with these policies (e.g., Burawoy 2000; Southworth 2004).
These conflicting findings between the qualitative and quantitative methods remain
unresolved (Popov 2000; Popov 2007).
Could part of the differences in findings between methods be a result of bias in
the statistics used in these quantitative analyses? Or, are the reform indexes
constructed by the EBRD biased? Indeed, as advisors, financers and surveyors of
market reforms, the EBRD’s bureaucracy had both incentives and ample opportunities
for self-fulfilling codings. 2
The EBRD’s coverage of transition policies offers a rare opportunity to
measure this potential bias. It has produced, alongside its Transition Indicator dataset,
a Transition Report text series. These detailed texts, released annually, contain
1

Virtually every large cross-national analysis of transition has relied upon the statistics produced by
the EBRD for measuring progress in market reform.

2

First, the EBRD’s conflicting roles as both advisor and evaluator create incentives for their analysts to
factor economic growth into their measures of the implementation of their preferred policies. Selffulfilling codings would be possible because the construction of statistics takes place after country
performance has been observed, as Merlevede and Schoors (2004) point out. Secondly, the EBRD
promotes a particular ideology, representing a neo-liberal version of contemporary capitalism, that
emphasizes deregulation and privatization. This disposition might also create unconscious ideological
bias among officers of the EBRD bureaucracy.
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extensive quantitative information on actual progress in transition policies for 29 excommunist countries. In this study, we have compiled a ‘gold-standard’ dataset on
transition policies from the quantitative data reported in the text of the EBRD’s
transition reports. We then tested for systematic deviations between these actual data
and the statistics constructed by EBRD’s bureaucracy.
The rest of this article is as follows: In the first two sections, we briefly review
the social and intellectual context of transition as well as the few existing studies that
have attempted to evaluate potential bias in the statistics produced by IFIs. In the third
section, we describe how we collected our ‘gold-standard’ data for assessing bias in
the EBRD’s statistics. In the fourth section we show the results of several diagnostic
tests of deviations between actual data on reform and the statistics constructed by the
EBRD. In the fifth we re-visit the analysis of transition policies on economic growth,
after correcting for potential coding biases. We conclude by noting the limitations of
this work, but by arguing that it has implications for the unresolved “Shock Therapy
versus Gradualism” debate and more generally for studies relying upon statistics
constructed by IFIs and other policy institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and
the Heritage Foundation.

Social and Intellectual Context of Transition Reforms
A small group of neo-liberal economists at a handful of major research
universities and within the EBRD, IMF and World Bank provided both intellectual
guidance and legitimacy for politicians pushing neoliberal transition policies. These
neo-liberals argued that a successful transition to capitalism from communism
required three sets of policies to be undertaken as rapidly as possible: mass
privatization, liberalization of prices and trade, and stabilization programmes. If these
policies were not extensively and rapidly undertaken, it was argued, capitalism might
never be successfully reached, which risked a return to state socialism (Åslund 2007).
In the short-run, these reforms were predicted to be painful for Soviet workers and
managers, but in the long-run they were argued to boost economic growth and lead to
convergence with western capitalist economies.
Given these social and intellectual stakes, and the disastrous outcomes that
were already apparent already in the early 1990’s, the EBRD faced clear incentives to
classify the more successful countries as having achieved faster progress in
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implementing the controversial neoliberal reforms. But if the EBRD’s bureaucracy
was biased, and this bias worked its way into the statistics, how would we know?

Evaluating Bias in the Statistics Produced by Global Knowledge Agencies
The few existing studies that have attempted to investigate the possibility that
International Financial Institutions (IFI) ‘build success’ into their statistics and
analysis have centred on the World Bank. Banerjee et al (2006) assessed the work of
the World Bank over a twenty year period and noted that research methods were often
used without adequate rigor, and economic models were simply ‘tinkered with’ to
provide justification for World Bank policies. More recent work by Kurtz and
Schrank (2007) evaluated the World Bank’s coding of ‘good governance’ by
exploiting the time-dimension in their data. Using granger-style causality tests, they
investigated whether higher governance scores preceded or followed the Bank’s
desired economic outcomes. Kurtz and Schrank found weak support for the notion
that better governance, as measured by the World Bank, was connected with
successive improvements in growth. Instead, they found that the perception-based
codings of policies were biased by ‘halo effects’ of prior growth, such that greater
past growth correlated significantly with higher governance ratings in future periods
but higher past governance ratings were uncorrelated with successive growth.
The postcommunist economies provide a rare opportunity for testing the
potential for bias in the basic statistical measures developed for evaluating policy
success and failure. The EBRD constructed a set of measures of progress in market
policies on the basis of a raw set of transition policy data. By closely reviewing the
pieces of raw data reported in the EBRD’s Transition Report series and World Bank
Europe and Central Asia privatization database, we have been able to compare the
data on progress in market reform, which were available to the EBRD at the time of
coding, with their constructed statistics, which are relied upon by the rest of the
intellectual community. Therefore, despite the usual monopoly by IFIs on information
faced by academics, we have been able to evaluate the relationship between the
underlying economic data and the codings of economic progress produced by the
EBRD.

Data and Methods
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Our analysis of the potential bias in the EBRD statistics focuses on the two
most crucial economic reforms: privatization and liberalization. 3 The EBRD has
constructed four indices measuring progress in these areas for twenty nine
postcommunist countries: a small-scale index privatization, a large-scale index of
privatization, a price liberalization index, and a foreign exchange and trade
liberalization index. These indices scale from 1 (planned economy) to 4+ (advanced
market economy), and move in increments of approximately 0.3 units (see Table 1 for
more details). Of the two liberalisation indices, we focused only on price
liberalisation, because index on foreign exchange and trade liberalisation index
attempted to collapse two policies into one dimension, and because the relationship
between foreign trade liberalization and quantitative measures of such liberalization,
like average tariff levels, was much lower (r=.33?).This could also be due to the
difficulty in quantifying barriers to trade.
[Table 1 about here]
These indices explicitly include subjective judgements about progress in
transition by the EBRD staff (EBRD 1996; EBRD 2007) 4 : "Transition indicator
scores reflect the judgment of the EBRD's Office of the Chief Economist about
country-specific progress in transition." (EBRD 2009). Analysts at the EBRD note
further that “the hardest conceptual issues concern the definition and measurement of
reform. Any attempt to assign numbers to a country’s progress in transition is
inherently difficult and carries a large degree of subjectivity” (Falcetti, Lysenko and
Sanfey 2005: 6).
The EBRD codings of progress in reform could thus be decomposed into three
parts: actual progress in market policies, subjective bias, and measurement error.
To measure “actual progress in market policies”, we have compiled the data
sources available to the EBRD by compiling the data published in their Transition
Report Series. This ‘gold standard’ dataset allows us to evaluate the validity of the
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A third, stabilization programmes, was viewed as necessary to suppress inflationary pressures and
ensure markets provided the right information in the form of stable prices. However, specific indices
for this policy are not included in the Transition Indicator statistical database.

4

In personal communication with an EBRD economist, we were told on occasion a team of analysts
would sit down with the economic data to discuss country progress in implementing market reforms
and then decide the appropriate coding.
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EBRD indices. 5 To improve our sample size, we have enriched our set with data
from the World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Privatization Database and countryspecific sources, which were available to the EBRD when constructing their statistics
(see Appendix 1 for all sources). None of our basic results was affected by this step.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of our dataset.
[Table 2 about here]
As sceptical observers, we might ask ourselves: what if we, too, may have
incorporated subjective bias in our statistics? We collected only the quantitative data
that would have also been available to the EBRD at the time of coding the indices,
and the majority of the data is directly taken from EBRD sources that were published
in the Transition Report series alongside the Transition Indicator database. Any bias
in our data would thus only reproduce the biases in the existing data on policy
implementation. 6 This feature of our data enables us to distinguish the potential biases
introduced by the EBRD’s bureaucracy from those introduced in reports from
government agencies to the EBRD.
If there were no systematic bias in the EBRD’s construction of statistics, any
differences between the EBRD’s coding of the policy and the underlying policy data
should register as random measurement error. Thus, in a simple model regressing the
EBRD policy on the underlying policy data, or EBRD Policy Index = βActual Policy
Outcome + ε, we should find that the measurement error, or ε, should be normally
distributed and vary similarly across the actual progress in market reforms.

Hypothesis #1: Differences between EBRD coding of market reforms and actual
reforms are random
Conditional on rejecting hypothesis #1, we tested whether factors relevant to the
EBRD, such as growth in economic output, might explain why some countries were
over- or under-coded.
5

As one of many possible examples, in describing Armenia’s progress in privatization, the country
assessments in the EBRD Transition Report series notes: 1994: large-scale privatization begins; 1995:
1,100 medium- and large-scale (MLSE) enterprises were converted to joint stock companies in 1995.
1996: a further 626 MSLE firms were privatized. 1997: 88.4% of all firms had been privatized, with an
additional 650 expected to be privatized by the end of the year.
6
Only one source of measurement error should exist between the EBRD’s Transition Indicator
statistics and the data reported in the Transition Report texts. The EBRD staff backdated a very small
number of their codings in the Transition Indicator series in cases when more accurate information was
subsequently released.
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Hypothesis #2: EBRD is more likely to code progress in market reform as greater
than it actually is when the economy grows

Results
To what extent is actual progress in market reforms captured in the EBRD’s
codings? Correlations between the actual policy and EBRD’s coded variables were
strong for privatization and liberalization (small-scale r = 0.90, large-scale r= 0.87,
price liberalization r = 0.80). That is, about 83% of the variations in the EBRD’s
small-scale privatization index, 76% in the EBRD’s large-scale privatization index
and 64% in the EBRD’s price liberalization index can be explained by the actual
policies. 7
[Figure 1 about here]
Although there is a strong correspondence between the actual and constructed
data, the EBRD’s scoring criteria appear out of sync with their corresponding policy
values. As shown in Table 3, a 3 on the EBRD large-scale privatization index denotes
at least 25% of state-owned enterprise assets privatized and a 4 denotes at least 50%
privatized. Yet, figure 1, plotting the average relationship between the EBRD indices
and actual progress in reform, reveals a 3 corresponds to a 62.5% privatized on
average, when such progress should, on average, have met the criteria for a 4 scoring.
Large variations occur across these codings: Armenia in 1998 and Moldova in 1997
had privatized 70% and 66% of their large-state owned enterprise assets, which
should have qualified as a 4, yet the EBRD coded them both as a 3. On the other
hand, Macedonia had only reached about 20% in 1996 and Poland less than 15% in
1994, but these countries were both coded as a 3.
[Table 3 about here]
For price liberalization, an unusual situation occurred where the EBRD
claimed little or no progress had been made in moving from a ‘planned economy’ to a
‘market economy’ in their Transition Report, when their Transition Indicators
showed the opposite (see Appendix 2). In 2003, Ukraine had state controls remaining
on 6 out of 15 goods in the EBRD’s basket for post-Soviet economies. This was
7

The EBRD’s constructed indices poorly reflected year-to-year progress in economic reform. When
evaluating the first-differences versions of these variables, the R2 drop to 0.36 for small-scale
privatization, 0.13for large-scale privatization and 0.16 for price liberalization.
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assigned a score of a 4 on the EBRD price liberalization index, or the standard of an
advanced market economy. Ukraine’s neighbouring country Belarus, on the other
hand, which was criticized by some for being exceptionally slow – “a Soviet theme
park” (Åslund 2001) –had state controls on only four out of 15 of these goods but was
given a 2.7 score.
Such coding discrepancies lead to confusion which manifests in, for example,
the debates among policy advisors about which countries have followed their policy
advice. The debate has been most heated for comparing Russia and Poland. Was
Russia, a relatively disastrous case, or Poland, a more successful country, the
archetype of the rapid approach to market reforms (so-called “Shock Therapy”)?
The EBRD indices provide little help in resolving this debate. For example, on
large-scale privatization, arguably the most controversial transition policy, according
to the EBRD Transition Indicator data, these countries were nearly indistinguishable
with regard to their progress. By 1994, both Russia and Poland had a coding of 3, and
by 1997, these countries advanced to a 3.3.
But the actual policy data reported in the text of the EBRD Transition Report
series reveal a clearer picture of the paths taken. By 1994, Poland had privatized less
than 15% of their large-scale state owned firms, falling just below the threshold for a
3 in the EBRD index. Russia had privatized roughly three-quarters of their large stateowned enterprise assets, which should have far exceeded the EBRD’s criteria for a 4.
Yet, the EBRD gave both countries the same score of 3. Between 1996 and 1997,
Poland gained another 0.3 points when the country had privatized 45% of large state
enterprises. Russia by this point had transferred almost all state enterprise assets to
private owners, but was again assigned the same score as Poland.

Diagnostic Tests of Coding Errors
Are these discrepancies between actual policy and the EBRD’s constructed
statistics random mistakes?
We tested whether the differences between the underlying data on actual
progress in market reforms and their associated scoring on the EBRD index was
consistent with random measurement error. Two quantitative criteria of random errors
were assessed: that the errors were normally distributed and that their variability was
constant.

10

To test whether the deviations between actual policy and the EBRD codings in
our basic models appeared to be random, we analyzed residual plots and applied
standard quantitative methods, a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and a Breusch-Pagan
test for constant variance. In all cases, the quantitative tests strongly reject the
normality (p<0.001) and constant variance (p<0.001) of these discrepancies, which
were consistent findings with those graphically depicted in the residual plots (see
Appendix 3).
Ruling out that the EBRD’s coding errors were not simply random does not
prove subjective bias, but it does provide further evidence that EBRD’s process of
measuring progress in market reforms was markedly inconsistent.

Determinants of Coding Errors
Next we tested whether these discrepancies were systematic. That is, could the
errors be explained by factors other than the EBRD’s criteria? Because the EBRD’s
principal measure of success was economic growth, we evaluated the relationship
between the coding deviations and several measures of economic performance.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 shows the results of fifteen regressions of the residual of the basic
model on multiple measures of economic performance. While not all measures of
economic performance were statistically significant predictors of over- or undercoding, faster growing economies generally received higher scores of progress in
privatization. Both Poland and Macedonia, which had their progress in large-scale
privatization significantly over-coded, were among the top-5 growth performers.
Among the measures of economic we tested, the most important correlate of coding
deviations was economic growth in the preceding year.

Robustness Checks
Before proceeding, we performed a series of checks to our specification,
sample and explanatory variables. First, we replicated all of our analysis using only
within-country changes in the policy variables. None of the results was different,
although in some cases the estimated biases were weaker than the models using fullvariation, suggesting that the potential bias may have related to analysts picking
favourite ‘neoliberal’ top-performing countries. Second, we deleted potential outlying
values based on a conservative cutoff of two standard deviations. Although the
11

connection between the EBRD indices and the raw policy data improved to r = 0.84
for large-scale and r = 0.95 for small-scale, the basic issues persisted.
Next, we considered some alternative explanations. We tested whether a
country’s membership in the former Soviet Union might have been an important
factor, which may be indicative of a western bias. We found that the core Soviet
countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, were coded on average -0.32 points lower
(or were 27% more likely to be undercoded) than satellite countries, such as Czech
Republic and Hungary, in the EBRD’s small-scale privatization index, after holding
constant these countries’ level of progress in small-scale privatization.
Lastly, we tested reliable data on mortality rates, which Sen (1998) argues is
an important alternative measure of economic success and failure and would arguably
not have been an explicit factor in the EBRD’s analysts’ construction of statistics. We
found that trends in mortality, measured in a variety of ways (life expectancy at birth
for men and women, heart disease mortality rates, suicide rates), had no effect on
deviations in coding across countries.
Returning to our hypotheses, we find strong evidence that the deviations
between the EBRD’s constructed statistics of country progress in market reforms and
the underlying data on these reforms are not simply mistakes, or random measurement
errors (hypothesis 1). These deviations appear systematic with regard to economic
performance (hypothesis 2), the principal measure of success and failure being studied
by the EBRD.

Re-evaluating the links between growth and market reform
Does the institutional bias in the construction of statistics have implications
for previous analyses of growth and market reform?
We revisited some basic models of the effects on growth of large-scale
privatization, the most contentious transition policy and index for which the bias was
the greatest. First, we reproduced findings that progress in large-scale privatization is
connected with higher growth in real GDP per capita (standard errors in parentheses,
n = 108):
(1a) Growth = -9.02 + 3.89 EBRD Large-Scale Privatization,
(3.59) (1.91, p = 0.045)
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Then, we ran our models using the raw large-scale privatization data:
(1b) Growth = -4.83 + 0.05 Percentage of Large-Scale Firms Privatized
(2.95) (0.07, p = 0.485)
Once the institutional bias is removed, the positive growth effect of large-scale
privatization disappears. While it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the
complex links between reforms and growth, these simple equations suggest that many
cross-national studies using the EBRD’s statistics have potentially substantially
overstated the links between neo-liberal reforms and positive outcomes.

Conclusion
Before evaluating the importance of our findings we must address their
limitations. First, our ‘gold-standard’ data on market reforms potentially incorporates
bias from the domestic agencies which reported data to the EBRD. However, this
enables us to pinpoint the bias introduced in the construction of statistics, while
avoiding the difficult assessments about actual progress in market reforms during
capitalist transition. Second, economic data are known to be unreliable in
postcommunist countries, and the EBRD strongly cautions against their use for the
early 1990’s. But no matter how inaccurate these economic data may have been, they
could have played a role in statistic-generating process. Not the least for these two
reasons, we have not attempted in this paper to establish a ‘truer’ relationship between
transition reforms and economic success.
Our analysis has shown that one major global knowledge agency, the EBRD,
has systematically built economic success into its statistics of progress in market
reforms. The longstanding, and as yet unresolved, debate on the quantitative effects of
neo-liberal reforms has thus been, to some extent, rigged from the outset. These
findings call into question hundreds of studies which have relied on Transition
Indicator data for studying economic and social outcomes, as any findings will be
identified in part by a significant institutional bias. Understanding differences in the
extent to which studies have successfully corrected for self-fulfilling codings may
help resolve the conflicting statistical findings about the effects of the neo-liberal
approaches to capitalism.
We cannot rule out the possibility that this institutional bias operated subconsciously or at the level of habitus among the EBRD bureaucracy, although we
13

found that the measures of economic success of focal interest to the EBRD, and the
associated global financial elite, were strongly connected with over-coding successful
countries but that other generalized measures of social welfare, such as mortality data,
were not.
While the World Bank is to be applauded for allowing independent audits of
some of their work, other global knowledge agencies, including the IMF and the
EBRD, now need to follow suit, especially because these institutions receive public
funding and claim legitimately to promote the public good. Theoretically, our work
provides a further piece of modern empirical support for theorists such as Foucault on
the intimate relations between knowledge (in this case statistics) and power (the neoliberal hegemony). Scientifically, our findings issue a note of caution for those relying
upon socially constructed policy indices for cross-national analysis.
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Figure 1a. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices
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Figure 1b. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices
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Figure 1c. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices
Price Liberalization
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Table 1. Description of European Bank for Reconstruction & Development
Capitalist Transition Indicators
Table 1. Description of European Bank for Reconstruction & Development Capitalist Transition Indicators
Market Reform

EBRD Description of Coding

EBRD Small-Scale
Privatization Index†

1 Little progress
2 Substantial share privatized
3 Comprehensive program almost ready for implementation
4 Complete privatization of small companies with tradable ownership rights
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership
of small enterprises; effective tradability of land

EBRD Large-Scale
Privatization Index†

1 Little private ownership
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed
3 More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of
being privatized (with the process having reached a stage at which the state has effectively
ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate
governance
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and
significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75
percent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance

EBRD Price
Liberalization Index†

1 Most prices formally controlled by government
2 Price controls for several important categories; state procurement at non-market prices
remains substantial
3 Substantial progress on price liberalisation: state procurement at non-market prices
largely phased out
4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; utility pricing which reflects economic costs
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies; comprehensive price
liberalisation; efficiency-enhancing regulation of utility pricing

Note: Data are scaled from 1 (planned economy) to 4.3 (advanced market economy. Definitions are quoted directly
from the EBRD Transition Report series, available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/sci.xls. The
indices have remained largely unchanged since 1994 and have been backdated so that they assess the extent of
transition from 1989 to the present. The EBRD website notes that, "Transition indicator scores reflect the judgment
of the EBRD's Office of the Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition" (EBRD 2009).

Table 2. Descriptives of ‘Gold-Standard’ Dataset
Table 2. Descriptives of Actual Policy Variables
Variable Name
Small Scale
Privatization
Large Scale
Privatization
Price Liberalization

Definition
Percentage of small scale
enterprises privatized
Percentage of large scale
enterprises privatized
Percentage of State-controlled
Prices liberalized in EBRD-15*

Obs
405
131
432

Mean
(Std. Dev)
69.16%
(39.41)
23.31%
(31.55)
72.33%
(28.06)

Min

Max

0%

100%

0%

98.26%

0%

100%

Note: * EBRD-15 is a basket of goods that includes 15 key consumer goods such as milk,
bread, gasoline and transportation costs. Web Appendix 1 further describes sources of data.

Table 3. Relationships between EBRD Constructed Indices and Actual Data on
Market Reform
Actual Market Reform Data
Percentage of Small
Enterprises Privatized
Percentage of Large
Enterprises Privatized
Percentage of Prices
liberalizeda
Constant
R2

Small Scale
Privatization
0.027***
(0.00006)

EBRD Reform Index
Large Scale
Price
Privatization
Liberalization
—

—

—

0.028**
(0.001)

—

—

—

1.369***
(0.050)
0.825

1.254***
(0.054)
0.763

0.029***
(0.001)
1.441***
(0.081)
0.644

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a – prices liberalized are based on a bundle of 15
goods selected by the EBRD, including food and transportation. Similar results were found
when specifying the constant to equal 1, or the ‘planned economy’ stage of the EBRD
coding.
*- p<0.05 ** - p<0.01 ***- p<0.001

Table 4. Determinants of Deviations between Actual Reform Data and Constructed EBRD
Indices
Table 4. Determinants of Deviations between Actual Reform Data and Constructed EBRD Indices
Small-Scale
Large-Scale
Price
Measure of Economic Success
Privatization
Privatization
Liberalization
0.13**
0.45***
0.21***
Positive Growth in Previous Year
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.06)
-0.01
-0.03**
0.05
Negative Growth in Previous Year
(-0.06)
0.09)
(0.07)
0.18***
0.13
0.09**
Previous Level of Log GDP per capita
(0.03)
(0.08)
(0.03)
0.18**
0.13
0.22**
‘Top 5’ Average growth, 1991-1996
(0.06)
(0.11)
(0.07)
-0.29***
-0.08
0.07
‘Worst 5’ Average growth, 1991-1996
(0.06)
(0.09)
(0.07)
Notes: Coefficients presented from 15 models regressing the residual of the first-step model, EBRD Policy Index = α +
βActual Policy + ε, on measures of GDP. Growth based on trends in GDP per capita in current USD. Standard errors in
parentheses.
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Web Appendix 1. Data Sources and Sample
Small- and Large-Scale Privatization
Data on privatization are taken from the quantitative data reported in the text of the EBRD
Transition Report series. We included quantitative data from the World Bank Europe and
central Asia Privatization Database. For Albania, data points from AlbInvest, the state
privatization agency, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, were included. For
Bulgaria, data from the Bulgarian privatization agency were included. For Lativa, data were
taken from World Bank authors Soo Im and colleagues 1993, Privatization in the republics of
the former Soviet Union: Framework and initial results, page 48, as part of the World Bank
Private Sector Development and Privatization group.
Price Liberalization
All price liberalization data were taken from the EBRD. The main source was the text
descriptions of progress in liberalizing prices out of the 15 goods tracked by the
EBRD(flour/bread, meat, milk, gasoline/petrol, cotton textiles, shoes, paper, cars, television
sets, cement, steel, coal, wood, rents, inter-city bus service). In cases of missing data, we
included the raw data from the EBRD Structural and Institutional Change Data, found in the
EBRD Transition Indicators Database.
Sample
Countries included in the sample were:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Web Appendix 2. Data points coded as 1, or no progress, by EBRD, despite
significant actual price liberalization
Year
Country
Belarus
Bulgaria
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Moldova
Moldova
Romania
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Ukraine

1991
1990
1991
1991
1989
1990
1991
1990
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1992
1993

Percentage of prices
liberalized in EBRD-15
basket
60.00.
20.00
66.67
66.67
26.67
26.67
26.67
6.67
46.67
46.67
46.67
53.33
60.00
40.00
40.00

As an example of these mismatches, we spotlight two cases: Ukraine in 1992/1993
and Belarus in 1991
Ukraine
Source #1: EBRD Transition Report Text
1994 – “Price regulations have intensified since start of 1992, after price liberalisation
in 1991”
1995 – “Comprehensive Reform programme was introduced in 1994. Before this
period, pervasive price controls through whole economy. Majority removed with a
few in monopolies. Further price adjustments in 1994-1995. Price controls remain
only for bread, utilities and public transportation.”
EBRD Structural Change Data

Year
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Number Of Goods
with Administered
Prices (out of 15)
15
15
15
9
9
9
5
3

EBRD Price
Liberalization Index
1
1
1
1
1
2.7
3.7
3.7

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

3
3
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
5
5

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm
Belarus
1994 “Producer prices liberalised in 1992, but ceilings on profit margins were put in
place.”
1995 “Large share of producer goods were liberalised since 1992, however ceilings
on retail margins were introduced but these have since been removed. IMF
agreements see most prices liberalised in 1994-1995.”
1996 “Large number liberalized in early 1991, process of price liberalization
completed in early 1995, though some controls still apply to bread and other food.”
EBRD Structural Change Data
Number Of Goods
with Administered
Year
Prices (out of 15)
15
1989
15
1990
6
1991
6
1992
6
1993
6
1994
6
1995
6
1996
6
1997
6
1998
6
1999
6
2000
6
2001
6
2002
4
2003
5
2004
6
2005
6
2006

EBRD Price
Liberalization Index
1
1
1
2.3
2.3
2.7
3.7
3.7
4
2.7
2.3
2.3
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7
2.7

26

2007

7

2.7

Available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm
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Web Appendix 3. Representative Residual versus Predictor Plot, Small-Scale
Privatization

0

20

40

60

EBRD Small-Scale Privatization Index

80

100

